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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress validly abrogated state sovereign 
immunity via the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 
Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (“CRCA”), 
in providing remedies for authors of original 
expression whose federal copyrights are infringed by 
States. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are scholars of constitutional law, federal 
jurisdiction, and civil rights law who have taught and 
written about the Eleventh Amendment and state 
sovereign immunity for many years. We present this 
brief in an effort to make our scholarship and 
experience useful to the Court.1
Samuel Bagenstos is the Frank G. Millard 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, where 
he teaches and writes about constitutional law and 
civil rights. Professor Bagenstos successfully briefed 
and argued United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 
(2006) in this Court. 
Neil S. Siegel is the David W. Ichel Professor of 
Law and Professor of Political Science at Duke 
University, where he teaches and writes about 
constitutional law and federal jurisdiction. 
Ernest Young is the Alston and Bird Professor of 
Law at Duke University, where he teaches 
Constitutional Law and Federal Courts. He has 
written extensively on this Court’s sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence, including how that 
jurisprudence bears on federal intellectual property 
laws. 
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. 
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici state that no counsel for any 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person 
or entity, other than Amici or their counsel, has made any 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of 
this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief suggests a path for resolving this 
important case that is faithful to the Constitution’s 
text and history, minimizes disruption to this Court’s 
state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, and 
maximizes the chance for consensus on the Court. The 
key is this Court’s unanimous decision, authored by 
Justice Antonin Scalia, in United States v. Georgia, 
546 U.S. 151 (2006). Georgia held that federal statutes 
abrogating state sovereign immunity are always valid 
when invoked by a plaintiff who can establish not only 
a statutory violation but also a constitutional one—
whether or not the statute would also be valid if 
prophylactically applied to state conduct that is not 
unconstitutional. This is the narrowest form of 
abrogation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It implements the special concern for 
constitutional rights demonstrated by the Framers of 
both the original Constitution and the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments. And it follows the teaching 
of unanimous Courts in both Georgia and Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which recognized 
Congress’s powers to enforce those rights through 
damages remedies even against nonconsenting states. 
In presenting this argument, amici do not wish to 
undermine or disparage the arguments pressed by 
Petitioners and other amici that Congress’s 
enumerated power to protect copyrights entails a 
waiver of state immunities in the plan of the 
Convention. Amici agree that copyright is a strong 
candidate for such a waiver under this Court’s 
decision in Central Virginia Community College v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). But that argument has been 
3 
ably presented by Petitioners and others, and amici
believe they can more usefully assist the Court by 
offering an alternative ground. Petitioners have 
compellingly alleged that North Carolina’s conduct 
violated both the Copyright Act and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Under Georgia, 
that is enough to decide this appeal. 
But whatever this Court does, it should not extend 
the reach of its decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Seminole’s holding—
that Congress generally may not abrogate state 
immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I 
powers—was unfaithful to the text of Article III or the 
Eleventh Amendment, and it overlooked crucial 
elements of the relevant history. This case does not 
require consideration whether Seminole should be 
overruled, because the CRCA satisfies both Katz’s 
conditions for waiver and the criteria for abrogation 
under Section 5. But this Court should not extend 
Seminole by applying it to an important federal 
statute, narrowing Katz’s waiver doctrine, or 
restricting the scope of permissible abrogation under 
Section 5. 
ARGUMENT
I. This Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe
should not be extended. 
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, this Court held 
that Congress generally cannot abrogate the sovereign 
immunity of the states when it acts pursuant to its 
Article I powers. 517 U.S. at 72-73. Amici believe that 
this holding rested on an incorrect reading of the 
relevant text and history. Whether or not the costs of 
4 
that decision overcome the presumption of stare 
decisis, however, is a difficult question that this Court 
need not consider in order to resolve this case. We 
canvass Seminole’s missteps in order to underscore 
the importance of not extending its holding. 
A. Seminole’s holding did not rest on the 
constitutional text. 
Article III extends the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction to “all cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This 
language generally authorizes federal courts to hear 
federal statutory claims. Article III says nothing about 
sovereign immunity; it neither creates it nor overrides 
it, if it can be derived from some other source. The only 
textual source for a constitutional doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity is the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
Most scholars have read this language to prohibit 
federal courts from hearing suits against states only 
when jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship; 
effectively, the amendment repeals the Citizen-State 
Diversity Clauses of Article III when the state is an 
unwilling defendant.2 And this Court has 
2 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an 
5 
unanimously agreed with that reading. The Seminole
majority acknowledged that “the text of the 
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article 
III diversity jurisdiction,” 517 U.S. at 54, and the 
dissenters affirmed that “[t]he history and structure of 
the Eleventh Amendment convincingly show that it 
reaches only to suits subject to federal jurisdiction 
exclusively under the Citizen–State Diversity 
Clauses,” id. at 110 (Souter, J., dissenting). Writing 
for the majority in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999), Justice Kennedy candidly acknowledged that 
the phrase “Eleventh Amendment immunity” is 
“something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity 
of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, 
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,” id. at 713. 
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition 
against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1982); John J. 
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 
(1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J.
1 (1988). The most significant scholarly disagreement 
about the text concerns whether it bars all cases in which 
diversity is present, or only those in which diversity is the 
sole basis of jurisdiction. Compare Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1342 (1989) (arguing that the “plain meaning” 
forbids jurisdiction over even federal question cases if the 
plaintiff is an out-of-stater), with William A. Fletcher, The 
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply 
to Critics, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989) (defending the 
diversity reading). That difference is irrelevant to this case 
because Petitioners are citizens of North Carolina. 
6 
The state sovereign immunity doctrine has existed 
apart from the constitutional text at least since Hans 
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Monaco v. 
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), for instance, this 
Court said that “[m]anifestly, we cannot rest with a 
mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article 
III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh 
Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits 
against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit 
and control,” id. at 321. But until Seminole Tribe, 
those penumbral “postulates” had never been allowed 
to do what only a constitutional principle can do: 
trump the clear mandate of a duly-enacted federal 
statute that explicitly overrode state sovereign 
immunity. 
Seminole’s reach beyond the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text is particularly troubling given that 
text’s highly specific nature. As John Manning has 
documented, “the Eleventh Amendment appears to 
have offered a carefully circumscribed answer to the 
larger question of how much sovereign immunity 
states should possess against the exercise of Article III 
jurisdiction.”3 Because the amendment process is 
designed to allow electoral minorities to force 
compromise, Dean Manning points out, interpreters 
“must be sensitive to the possibility that the 
Amendment’s precise enumeration of exceptions to the 
grant of Article III power carries a negative 
3 John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the 
Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L. J. 
1663, 1748 (2004). 
7 
implication, the product of an apparent decision to go 
so far and no farther in defining the desired exceptions 
to federal jurisdiction.”4 Hence, courts “must not 
readjust the Amendment’s precise terms to capture 
their apparent background purpose.”5 State sovereign 
immunity, in other words, should have constitutional 
weight only in those cases falling within the Eleventh 
Amendment’s text.6
B. Seminole’s reasoning was inconsistent 
with the founding generation’s treatment 
of common law doctrines. 
If the constitutional principle of state sovereign 
immunity cannot rest on the Eleventh Amendment, 
then it must come from somewhere else. The most 
plausible “somewhere else” is the common law. Justice 
Scalia argued in Union Gas that “the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity . . . was part of the understood 
4 Id. at 1750. 
5 Id.
6 One scholar has suggested that broad notions of state 
sovereign immunity can rest on the meaning of “state” as it 
appears throughout the constitutional text. See Michael B. 
Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The 
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 821 
(1999). But the text doesn’t do any actual work in this 
interpretation, see Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the 
Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 
1624-26 (2000), and it is far from clear that immunity was 
part of the “linguistic” meaning of “state” in the late 
eighteenth century, see Steven E. Sachs, Constitutional 
Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1872 (2012). 
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background against which the Constitution was 
adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did 
not mean to sweep away.” Pennsylvania v. Union Gas 
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). This argument has been 
taken up more recently by Professors William Baude 
and Steven Sachs, who see state sovereign immunity 
as a “constitutional backdrop”—a survival of the 
English common law that the Constitution did not 
abrogate and that Congress lacks power to change.7
Because these scholars offer the most conceptually 
clear defense of an extra-textual principle of state 
immunity, we consider their view in some detail. 
Amici agree that the common law forms a legal 
“backdrop” to the Constitution that generally 
continues in effect unless and until it is modified by 
positive law. Strong “clear statement” rules, of the sort 
that restrain all abrogation of state immunity, see 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
242 (1985), make sense on this ground.8 Likewise, it 
makes sense to hold that no state has power to alter 
another state’s preexisting immunities. See Franchise 
7 See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the 
Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2017); Sachs, 
supra, at 1868-75. 
8 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in 
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 936-37 
(1992) (defending the canon disfavoring broad 
constructions of statutes in derogation of the common law);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 
83 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 123-27 (2004) (arguing that “clear 
statement” rules offer strong protection for state 
autonomy). 
9 
Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 
(2019). But Seminole’s further step—which makes 
these common law rules impervious even to a clear 
statutory override—is insupportable. Neither Justice 
Scalia in Union Gas nor Professors Baude and Sachs 
have addressed the care with which the founding 
generation considered precisely how—and to what 
extent—the American legal systems should absorb 
common law norms.  
It was the states, not the national government, that 
generally “received” the common law.9 Each state did 
so through a positive act—usually state constitutional 
provisions, but sometimes state statutes or state court 
decisions.10 Moreover, as Justice Story noted, early 
Americans “brought with them and adopted only that 
portion [of the English common law] which was 
applicable to their situation.” Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 144 (1829). These reception 
measures generally made clear that common law 
principles thus adopted remained subject to legislative 
alteration.11
9 See, e.g., Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of 
Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 
(1951). 
10 See id. at 798-800. 
11 See, e.g., N.J. Const. art. XXII (1776) (“[T]he common law 
of England . . . shall remain in force, until [it] shall be 
altered by a future law.”); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 162 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (collecting early provisions); Hall, 
supra, 4 VAND. L. REV. at 798-89; GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 299-
300 (1969). 
10 
In this, of course, the common law received by the 
states was just like the common law of the mother 
country, whose doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
made every common law principle subject to legislative 
alteration.12 But subordination of common law 
principles to legislation proved central to the debate 
about receiving the common law into federal law. 
Some critics of the proposed Constitution, like George 
Mason, complained that it failed to secure “the 
enjoyment of the benefit of the common law.”13
Federalists replied that to do so would effectively 
destroy the notion of limited and enumerated powers, 
as the common law extended to all subjects.14 Even 
worse, Federalists contended, “a constitutional 
reception of the common law would leave it 
‘immutable,’ incapable of legislative revision.”15
Instead, they constitutionalized particular common 
law rights, like trial by jury or the writ of habeas 
corpus, while eschewing a general reception.16
12 See, e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 336-37 (5th ed. 1956). 
13 George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of 
Government, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (Max Farrand ed. 1911). See
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1256-57 (1985). 
14 See Jay, Part Two, supra, at 1259 (quoting Madison to 
the effect that a general reception of the common law 
“would have broken in upon the legal Code of every State”). 
15 Id. at 1258-59 (quoting Edmund Randolph). 
16 See Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in the United 
States: English Themes and American Variations, in 
11 
Later, the debate over federal reception of the 
common law resurfaced in relation to claims by the 
Adams administration that a general body of federal 
common law supported the validity of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.17 James Madison’s critique of that 
argument rejected any general notion of federal 
common law—in particular, because if such a common 
law were part of the Constitution, it would be immune 
from legislative alteration:  
[T]he consequence of admitting the common 
law as the law of the United States, on the 
authority of the individual States, is as 
obvious as it would be fatal. As this law relates 
to every subject of legislation, and would be 
paramount to the Constitutions and laws of 
the States, the admission of it would 
overwhelm the residuary sovereignty of the 
States, and by one constructive operation new 
model the whole political fabric of the 
country.18
Each of these episodes—the state reception statutes, 
the constitutional ratification debates, and the Alien 
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 123-24 
(Harry Jones ed. 1976). 
17 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part 
One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1077-83 (1985). 
18 Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in James Madison, 
WRITINGS 608, 640 (Jack Rakove ed. 1999) (1800); see also 
id. at 639 (“If . . . the common law is established by the 
Constitution, it follows that no part of the law can be 
altered by the legislature.”); Jay, Part One, supra, at 1090-
91. 
12 
and Sedition Act controversy—make clear that 
incorporation of common law principles into American 
law did not simply go without saying. Early Americans 
were careful to receive only so much of the common 
law as was useful in their particular states’ 
circumstances, to receive it almost entirely as state 
law rather than federal law, and to ensure that 
common law principles would be susceptible to 
legislative override.19
Without addressing this history, Professors Sachs 
and Baude assert that the Constitution denied 
Congress power to alter the common law principle of 
sovereign immunity. They ground this limitation in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, suggesting that 
“abrogating sovereign immunity is one of the ‘great 
and important’ or ‘great substantive and independent’ 
19 In Seminole, the majority opinion sought to ground state 
sovereign immunity in “the jurisprudence in all civilized 
nations,” rather than in the common law of England. 514 
U.S. at 69. The jurisprudence on which Seminole relied 
made no such distinction, although it used both terms. See
Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (emphasizing that a suit against a 
states by its own citizen was “not known . . . at the common 
law”). In any event, where the Constitution does 
incorporate a broader international jurisprudence—in the 
Admiralty Clause, for example—that jurisprudence has 
always been subject to legislative alteration. See, e.g., The 
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) 
(observing that “the Court is bound by the law of nations” 
until “an act be passed” by Congress). In Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-28 (2004), for example, this 
Court treated the extent to which the “law of nations” 
would be cognizable by American courts as pervasively 
subject to congressional choice. 
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powers that falls outside of the implied powers of 
Article I.”20 Yet each scholar presents this claim as an 
invitation to further inquiry—not as a historical 
demonstration.21
But striking down an act of Congress requires 
more. The Framers’ insistence on legislative control 
over the common law, as well as their concern that 
adopting the common law might perpetuate 
monarchical principles inappropriate for a republic,22
undermine any argument that abrogation is an 
“improper” power. Moreover, as we discuss in the next 
section, that argument is also inconsistent with the 
Framers’ theory of state sovereignty. 
A final problem is that Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment through “appropriate” 
legislation, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5, is generally 
equated with its “necessary and proper” authority 
20 Baude, supra, 103 VA. L. REV. at 15; see also Sachs, 
supra, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1874-75. 
21 See Baude, supra, at 15 (characterizing this rationale as 
“plausible”); Sachs, supra, at 1874 (stating that it “might 
be” true).  
22 See, e.g., Madison, Alien and Sedition Acts, supra, at 639 
(worrying that “an indefinite admission of the common law 
. . . might draw after it the various prerogatives making 
part of the unwritten law of England”); see also Letter from 
James Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 
WRITINGS, supra, at 140, 141 (noting with approval that 
“every State has made great inroads & with great propriety 
on this monarchical code”) (emphasis in original). 
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under Article I.23 Adopting the scholars’ theory that 
abrogation is inherently “improper”—which this Court 
has never done—would thus call into question this 
Court’s unanimous and unbroken line of cases holding 
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity 
when enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments. See, 
e.g., Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (“We think that 
Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate 
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private 
suits against States or state officials which are 
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”).  
C. Seminole’s reasoning was inconsistent 
with the founding generation’s view of 
state sovereignty. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies 
straightforwardly in a legal system with one unitary 
sovereign. But as Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he 
Framers split the atom of sovereignty.” U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In the Federalists’ political 
theory, ultimate sovereignty “resides in the PEOPLE, 
as the fountain of government.”24 Accordingly, the 
23 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966);
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A 
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153,
178 & n. 153 (1997). 
24 1 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
1787-1788, at 302 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. 
Stone eds., 1888) (quoting James Wilson); see generally
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE 
L. J. 1425, 1435-37 (1987).  
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sovereign People “can distribute one portion of power 
to the more contracted circle called State 
governments; they can furnish another portion to the 
government of the United States.”25 Each sovereign’s 
prerogatives were limited by this allocation. Hence, 
Chief Justice Marshall described the nation and the 
states as “each sovereign, with respect to the objects 
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to 
the objects committed to the other.” McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819).26
From this perspective, the Eleventh Amendment’s 
repudiation of Chisholm makes sense. Chisholm
involved a claim for payment of a debt grounded in 
state law.27 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 430. Under the 
Federalists’ political theory, Georgia was sovereign as 
to that law, and the Chisholm majority never 
satisfactorily explained why a state should not be 
treated as sovereign with respect to a claim under its 
own law.28 But as Justice Iredell’s dissent pointed out, 
the right answer might be different in a federal case 
“relat[ing] to the execution of the . . . authorities of the 
general Government (which it must be admitted are 
full and discretionary, within the restrictions of the 
Constitution itself).” 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 432. In that 
25 1 PENNSYLVANIA, supra, at 302 (quoting Wilson). 
26 See also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 
(1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“The United States are 
sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually 
surrendered; Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all 
the powers reserved.”). 
27 See Amar, supra, at 1472. 
28 See id. at 1469-73. 
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sort of case, “sovereignty has . . . been . . . delegated to 
the United States . . . wherein the separate 
sovereignties of the States are blended in one common 
mass of supremacy.” Id. at 435. Both the Federalists’ 
political theory and Justice Iredell’s application of it 
in Chisholm thus support Professor Akhil Amar’s 
conclusion that “[w]here governments are acting 
within the bounds of their delegated ‘sovereign’ power, 
they may partake of sovereign immunity; where not, 
not.”29
Respect for federalism, in this analysis, suggests 
that Congress may lack power to subject states to 
damages suits under state law. It also suggests that 
courts should not displace traditional state law 
immunities, including sovereign immunity, without a 
clear statement of Congress’s intent. See Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (presumption against 
altering traditional federal balance); Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (recognizing 
interpretive presumption against displacement of 
state law). And other aspects of the Framers’ federal 
plan—including the sovereign equality of states, see 
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493-94—explain why one state 
may not displace another state’s immunity. But when 
Congress speaks clearly, and acts within its 
enumerated powers, it exercises the People’s sovereign 
power. The Copyright Act plainly falls within 
Congress’s sphere, and so the Framers’ conception of 
sovereignty requires state immunity to yield. 
29 Amar, supra, at 1490-91, n. 261. 
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D. This Court can resolve this case without 
considering whether Seminole should be 
overruled. 
Because Seminole’s holding was inconsistent with 
the constitutional text and the founding generation’s 
views about sovereignty and the common law, it 
should not be extended to bar individual remedies 
under another important federal statute. Overruling 
that decision, however, would raise difficult and 
unnecessary questions of stare decisis. Seminole has 
stood for nearly a quarter century, and an extensive 
jurisprudence has grown up around it. Amici believe 
that this case can be a vehicle for refining Seminole’s 
impact without repudiating its central holding. 
While the Court’s decisions under Seminole have 
remained bitterly divided, this Court has 
unanimously embraced the proposition that Congress 
may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; United States v. Georgia, 
546 U.S. 151 (2006). In Georgia, in particular, this 
Court unanimously held that an abrogation statute is 
valid as applied to particular cases in which the 
plaintiff can establish an actual constitutional 
violation.  That principle resolves this case. And by 
insisting on a constitutional as well as a statutory 
violation, Georgia effectively redresses the most 
serious violations of national sovereignty while 
retaining significant safeguards against unwarranted 
impositions on state governments. 
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion below also narrowed 
the scope of Section 5 abrogation by imposing an 
additional and unwarranted clear statement 
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requirement and by demanding a pattern of past 
constitutional violations as a predicate for 
congressional legislation. These new doctrines make 
prophylactic abrogation under Section 5 extremely 
difficult. If this Court chooses to address prophylactic 
abrogation, it should reject these doctrinal 
innovations. 
II. Congress validly abrogated North Carolina’s 
sovereign immunity in the CRCA. 
This Court has unanimously agreed that Congress 
may abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acts 
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Such abrogation can happen in two ways: First, 
abrogation statutes may have a prophylactic effect, 
subjecting states to liability in all cases where they 
violate the terms of the statute, so long as that 
statute’s terms are “congruent and proportional to the 
targeted violation” of the Constitution. Board of 
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Second, even abrogation statutes 
that do not meet this standard may be enforced when 
the plaintiff can establish not only a statutory 
violation but an actual constitutional violation as well. 
Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158-59. The latter route provides 
the most expeditious way to resolve the present case. 
But the CRCA also meets this Court’s “congruence and 
proportionality” standard for prophylactic legislation, 
properly construed.  
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A. North Carolina is subject to damages 
liability in this case under this Court’s 
holding in United States v. Georgia. 
In United States v. Georgia, a disabled inmate of 
the Georgia state prison system challenged his 
conditions of confinement by suing the state 
Department of Corrections and several individual 
officers under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the Eighth Amendment. See 546 
U.S. at 154-55.30 The District Court dismissed the 
claims against the individual officers as unduly vague 
and all claims against the state defendants as barred 
by sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
as to state immunity, but reversed as to the officers, 
holding that the plaintiff should be allowed to develop 
his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 155-
56. This Court granted certiorari on the immunity 
issue only and reversed in a unanimous opinion by 
Justice Scalia. Id. at 157-59. 
Justice Scalia explained this result by drawing a 
sharp distinction between two different sorts of 
abrogation theories: 
While the Members of this Court have 
disagreed regarding the scope of Congress’s 
“prophylactic” enforcement powers under § 5 
30 Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual 
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12132. Congress explicitly abrogated the states’ 
immunity. See id. § 12202.  
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of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . no one 
doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to 
“enforce . . . the provisions” of the Amendment 
by creating private remedies against the 
States for actual violations of those provisions. 
. . . This enforcement power includes the power 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity by 
authorizing private suits for damages against 
the States.  
546 U.S. at 158-59. The Court characterized all of its 
previous Section 5 abrogation cases as involving 
prophylactic theories, under which the plaintiffs had 
alleged only a violation of the statute. Id. at 157-58. It 
is not clear whether the plaintiff’s ADA Title II claim 
could have prevailed on such a theory. This Court had 
upheld prophylactic abrogation under Title II only “as 
it applies to the class of cases implicating the 
accessibility of judicial services,” Tennessee v. Lane, 
541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004), and it had struck down the 
ADA’s abrogation with respect to the general 
employment discrimination provisions of Title I, see
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. Nonetheless, because the 
plaintiff in Georgia had alleged a violation of not only 
Title II but also the Constitution itself, he was entitled 
to go forward. “[I]nsofar as Title II creates a private 
cause of action for damages against the States for 
conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” this Court explained, “Title II validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity.” 546 U.S. at 159. 
This Court has not elaborated on this as-applied 
form of abrogation since Georgia. But the courts of 
appeals have read Georgia to uphold abrogation 
legislation, like the CRCA, whenever the plaintiff can 
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establish an actual constitutional violation: “If the 
State’s conduct violated both [the statute] and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, [the statute] validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity.” Hale v. King, 
642 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2011). On the other hand, 
“[i]f the State's conduct violated [the statute] but did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the court 
must then determine ‘whether Congress's purported 
abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of 
conduct is nevertheless valid’” as prophylactic 
legislation under the congruence and proportionality 
test. Id. (quoting Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159). The upshot 
is that “if a plaintiff alleges a statutory violation that 
is also an actual constitutional violation, the court 
need not examine whether that statute could validly 
prohibit facially constitutional conduct under the City 
of Boerne test.”  National Association of Boards of 
Pharmacy v. Board of Regents of the University System 
of Georgia, No. 3:07-CV-084 (CDL) 2008 WL 1805439, 
at *7 (M.D. Ga. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part on 
other grounds, 633 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2011). 
The straightforward “as-applied” test from Georgia 
handily decides the present appeal. Petitioners have 
alleged not only that North Carolina violated the 
Copyright Act, but also that this infringement actually 
violated the Constitution by depriving them of their 
property without due process of law. No one disputes 
that the copyrights in question count as “property” 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. And 
although this Court noted in Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), that not all 
intellectual property infringements amount to 
constitutional violations, Petitioners’ claims here are 
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not vulnerable to the same difficulties. First, 
Petitioners have alleged that the infringement was 
intentional rather than merely negligent. See Brief for 
Petitioner at 8-9. Compare Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 
at 645 (noting that “a state actor’s negligent act that 
causes unintended injury to a person's property does 
not ‘deprive’ that person of property within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause”). And second, 
Petitioners have alleged that state law affords them 
no remedy. Compare id. at 643 (emphasizing that “a 
deprivation of property without due process” occurs 
“only where the State provides no remedy, or only 
inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its 
infringement of their patent”). Indeed, on the 
extraordinary facts presented here, the state 
legislature went so far as to specifically bar any 
remedy for the alleged infringement. See Brief for 
Petitioners at 13 (discussing “Blackbeard’s Law,” H.B. 
184, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-25(b)). 
This Court should stop there. The CRCA is 
constitutional as applied to this case, and this Court 
need not consider whether it sweeps too broadly in 
other circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 24-25 (1960) (refusing to consider 
whether Congress had legislated beyond its Fifteenth 
Amendment authority because “if the complaint here 
called for an application of the statute clearly 
constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that 
should have been an end to the question of 
constitutionality”). This Court can wait for another 
day to decide whether the CRCA is also valid 
prophylactic legislation, as well as whether the 
Copyright Clause amounts to a waiver in the “Plan of 
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the Convention” under Central Virginia Community 
College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Georgia’s reasoning strikes a sensible balance 
between Congress’s concern for statutory enforcement 
and the legitimate values of governmental autonomy 
and solvency that sovereign immunity protects. A 
plaintiff’s ability to establish not only a statutory 
violation but a constitutional one as well is not a 
perfect proxy for the severity of the violation, but it 
does provide a decent filter. And certainly Georgia
provides no basis for broad abrogations in the areas of 
contract or tort law that might threaten the states’ 
financial viability—the key historical concern of 
sovereign immunity law.31 Georgia is not only the 
narrowest available ground for decision here, but also 
the one that sensibly balances the legitimate concerns 
on each side of the immunity debate. 
B. Congress’s prophylactic statutory 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity in 
the CRCA should be upheld. 
This Court may also resolve this case as an 
instance of prophylactic abrogation designed to 
prevent or remedy deprivations of federal intellectual 
property rights without due process of law. In this 
case, the Fourth Circuit made two innovations that 
31 See Ernest A. Young, Its Hour Come Round at Last? State 
Sovereign Immunity and the Great State Debt Crisis of the 
Early Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
593 (2012) (arguing that the core purpose of state sovereign 
immunity is to ward off existential threats to state solvency 
like the Revolutionary war debts in Chisholm or the 
Reconstruction bonds in Hans). 
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undermined this Court’s Section 5 abrogation 
jurisprudence. First, the court of appeals required that 
Congress must not only speak clearly with respect to 
its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity, but also 
that it must explicitly specify the correct 
constitutional power when doing so. Second, the 
Fourth Circuit required that Congress must have 
considered a sufficiently extensive “pattern” of past 
constitutional violations, whether or not such 
violations exist outside the legislative record or have 
developed since Congress acted. Both these holdings 
were error, and both undermine the viability of 
Section 5 abrogation. 
1. Congress need not explicitly invoke 
Section 5 in order to abrogate state 
immunities under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In the present case, the Fourth Circuit said flatly 
that “[n]either the text of the [CRCA] nor its 
legislative history indicates any invocation of 
authority conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  And without such an invocation, the Act 
cannot effect a valid abrogation under § 5.”  895 F.3d 
at 351. This holding added an additional hoop for 
Congress to jump through when overriding state 
sovereign immunity.  This Court has already required 
that “Congress may abrogate the States’ 
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal 
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear 
in the language of the statute.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. 
at 242. The Fourth Circuit transformed this stringent 
requirement into a double clear statement rule: 
Congress must now not only make its intent to 
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abrogate the States’ immunity unmistakably clear 
(which all admit Congress did in the CRCA), but it 
must also clearly specify the particular enumerated 
power upon which it relies to do so. Even if one 
generally favors clear statement rules,32 this double 
one goes too far. 
The Court plainly rejected this sort of reasoning in 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983): 
It is in the nature of our review of 
congressional legislation defended on the 
basis of Congress's powers under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that we be able to 
discern some legislative purpose or factual 
predicate that supports the exercise of that 
power.  That does not mean, however, that 
Congress need anywhere recite the words 
“section 5” or “Fourteenth Amendment” or 
“equal protection,” for “[t]he constitutionality 
of action taken by Congress does not depend 
on recitals of the power which it undertakes to 
exercise.”  
Id. (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476–
478 (1980) (plurality opinion), and quoting Woods v. 
Miller, 333 US. 13, 144 (1948)). Likewise, this Court 
demanded no such “clear statement” of reliance on the 
Section Five power in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); rather, it determined 
simply that Congress had clearly stated its intent to 
subject the States to damages liability under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, see id. at 73-78, 
32 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1364-66 (2001). 
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and then went on to assess whether that statute could 
pass City of Boerne’s “congruence and proportionality” 
test, see id. at 80-91. This Court applied no double 
clear statement rule of the sort fashioned by the 
Fourth Circuit.33
In the CRCA’s case, it is easy to understand why 
Congress did not invoke Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment:  Under the law as it stood 
when the CRCA was enacted, Congress did not have 
to rely on that power. Prior to this Court’s decision in 
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, the Copyright Act had 
generally been understood to render states liable for 
copyright infringements.34 Congress enacted the 
CRCA in 1990 to provide the explicit statement that 
Atascadero demanded. See H.R. Rep. 101-282(I) (Oct. 
13, 1989).  But this Court had held the year before that 
Congress may abrogate the States’ immunity 
pursuant to its ordinary Article I powers. See 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). It 
thus did not matter whether abrogation rested on the 
Commerce Clause, the Copyright Clause, or the 
Reconstruction Amendments until Seminole in 1996, 
33 This Court did say that Congress should explicitly invoke 
its Section Five powers in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
469-70 (1991). But the Court’s task in Gregory was to 
construe the reach of Congress’s statute—an enterprise 
that this Court viewed in Wyoming as quite different from 
“adjudg[ing] its constitutional validity.”  460 U.S. at 243 
n.18.   
34 See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 
2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, 108th 
Cong. 90-91 (2003) (testimony of Paul Bender). 
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well after the CRCA had become law. To hold that 
Congress must revisit this issue a third time in order 
to specify under which enumerated power it seeks to 
abrogate is to play Lucy with Charlie Brown’s football. 
The Fourth Circuit’s holding will affect the validity 
of any statute that might be defended under the 
Section Five power.  It will encourage courts to 
speculate whether other powers must also be 
specifically invoked in order to ground a federal 
statute.  It invites the question whether, when 
Congress does invoke Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it may nonetheless miscarry by not 
properly stating the particular constitutional theory
that may sustain the legislation. And Congress may 
respond by simply inserting legislative history 
invoking a blunderbuss-shot of constitutional 
authorities for courts to sort out later.  Instead, this 
Court should return to the settled rule that “the 
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not 
depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to 
exercise.” Woods, 333 U.S. at 144. 
2. Congress need not show a pattern of 
past violations at the time that it 
legislates. 
The Fourth Circuit did not consider whether the 
terms of the CRCA were congruent and proportional 
to the Due Process Clause’s protections for property. 
Rather, like several other circuits, the Fourth Circuit 
erected an additional hurdle for Section Five 
legislation by ruling that Congress may not legislate 
under that power if the legislative record does not 
show a pattern of past constitutional violations by the 
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States.35 Finding that “the record before Congress 
contained at most a dozen incidents of copyright 
infringement by States that could be said to have 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment,” the court of 
appeals concluded that “[t]his evidence plainly falls 
short of establishing the ‘widespread and persisting 
deprivation of constitutional rights’ that is required to 
warrant prophylactic legislation under § 5.” 895 F.3d 
at 353 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
526 (1997)). To make matters worse, the Fourth 
Circuit disregarded evidence relied upon by the 
district court that such violations have radically 
increased in the years since Congress enacted the 
CRCA. See id. at 353-54. Amici agree with Petitioners 
that, because there is a very large record of 
unconstitutional state deprivations of copyright 
interests, the CRCA handily vaults any “pattern” 
hurdle. See Brief for Petitioners at 46-53. But Section 
Five imposes no such requirement,36 and this case 
affords this Court a valuable opportunity to clarify 
that point. 
No other enumerated power of Congress is thought 
to entail such a requirement. If Congress wishes to 
prohibit a particular activity under the Commerce 
Clause, it need not show that anyone is already 
engaging in such activity or that the activity would 
35 See also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 605-
06 (5th Cir. 2000). 
36 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the 
Federal Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the 
Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEXAS L.
REV. 1551, 1578-81 (2003). 
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harm the interstate economy. If Congress wished to 
set safety standards for driverless cars, for example, it 
might be prudent to wait until some such cars had 
been introduced, but nothing in the Constitution 
would foreclose it from regulating wholly 
prospectively.  
So, too, with the Section 5 power. In Boerne, this 
Court made clear that Section 5 confers authority to 
“remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions.” 521 U.S. 
at 519 (emphasis added). If Congress wished to 
prevent states from adopting new genetic screening 
technologies in hiring state employees, it could do so 
under the Section 5 power even if no state had yet 
adopted those technologies; the only question would be 
whether use of the technology by a state would 
actually violate the Fourteenth Amendment. To hold 
otherwise would force this Court to consider a host of 
unanswerable questions, such as exactly how many 
past violations are necessary to “activate” the Section 
Five power, or whether state violations occurring after
Congress enacts a statute count towards validating 
that statute under Section 5. 
To be sure, a legislative record remains relevant for 
some purposes. This Court emphasized the lack of a 
legislative record showing instances of state violations 
of patent rights in Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-
41, and in some cases upholding Section 5 legislation 
it has noted the presence of such a record, see, e.g., 
Lane, 541 U.S. at 524-29. Especially where Congress 
acts prophylactically under Section 5, prohibiting 
some subset of constitutionally-permissible conduct in 
order to get at constitutionally forbidden conduct, a 
record of past state conduct can help a court assess the 
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relative proportions of those two classes of conduct. 
But as this Court has noted in its Commerce Clause 
cases, legislative findings and testimony can be 
helpful in determining whether a statute meets 
constitutional requirements, but they are not 
requirements in their own right. See United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612, 614 (2000).  
Moreover, Georgia made clear that where Congress 
need not rely on its ability to act prophylactically—in 
that case, where actually unconstitutional conduct is 
at issue—there is no requirement that Congress show 
such conduct to be frequent in order to prohibit it. See 
546 U.S. at 158-59 (upholding abrogation in cases of 
actual constitutional violations without considering 
whether past violations had occurred). If past 
constitutional violations were an independent 
prerequisite for valid Section Five legislation, then the 
plaintiff in Georgia could not have succeeded simply 
by providing that his own constitutional rights had 
been violated. 
At least since McCulloch v. Maryland, this Court 
has eschewed the sort of “necessity” requirement 
adopted by the Fourth Circuit here. Rather, this Court 
has “accord[ed] substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of Congress” in determining what problems 
warrant legislative solutions and how those solutions 
should be framed. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). Courts generally 
evaluate only whether the substance of federal 
legislation falls within the scope of an enumerated 
power—not whether events in the world have 
rendered that legislation necessary. A court’s view 
that legislation responds to no pressing current 
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circumstance is only a hair’s breadth away from a view 
that the law is simply bad policy—and neither is a 
sound basis for declaring the law unconstitutional. 
See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference 
& Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941) (“We are not 
concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or 
appropriateness of the legislation.”). In any event, 
Congress could surely conclude that some 
unconstitutional conduct is so egregious—a 
resurgence of lynching, for example—that it should 
legislate to prevent it in advance even if the conduct 
has not yet materialized. 
Finally, even if Section 5 legislation depends on 
establishing a pattern of state violations, this Court 
should reject the Fourth Circuit’s holding that after-
enactment violations do not count. See 895 F.3d at 
353. The District Court, in upholding the CRCA’s 
abrogation provision, had relied on extensive evidence 
of state copyright infringements that occurred after 
the CRCA’s enactment. This stands to reason. The 
CRCA clarified what had been the prior 
understanding that the Copyright Act abrogated state 
sovereign immunity.37 But it is hardly surprising that 
state violations proliferated after Florida Prepaid held 
in the analogous patent context that states could 
violate federal intellectual property rights without 
fear of monetary sanction. See Brief for Petitioners at 
44-45. Critically, the Fifth Circuit extended that 
ruling to copyrights just a year later. See Chavez, 204 
F.3d at 607-08. One should expect state copyright 
37 See Testimony of Paul Bender, Hearing on H.R. 2344, 
supra. 
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violations to multiply further if this Court affirms the 
Fourth Circuit. But it makes little sense to disable 
Congress from deterring such violations until the 
problem has festered for a sufficient period of time. 
The question is whether the law is constitutional now, 
not when enacted. 
As we have already suggested, the benefit of a 
record of violations is to assist the Court in 
determining whether Section 5 legislation is 
congruent and proportional—that is, whether most 
statutory violations are likely to also be constitutional 
ones. But it should make no difference whether that 
evidence is generated by Congress itself through 
hearings at the time of enactment, or whether it is 
submitted by the parties to litigation seeking to 
enforce the law in question. Congress is not an 
administrative agency whose work product is to stand 
or fall based on whether it considered the right kinds 
of evidence before acting.38 Rather, this Court reviews 
legislation simply to determine whether its substance 
falls within the bounds of a constitutionally-
enumerated power. 
The post-CRCA record of state copyright 
infringements, ably collected in Petitioners’ brief, 
documents Congress’s foresight in moving to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity for such violations in 1990. 
38 Cf. A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, 
Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the 
Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 329 (2001). To be clear, amici believe that 
such “on the record” review would be inappropriate, but do 
not read cases like Florida Prepaid to require it. 
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That Congress was ahead of events in this instance 
surely does not render the act unconstitutional. This 
Court should either uphold the CRCA’s 
constitutionality or remand to the court of appeals for 
reconsideration in light of the post-enactment 
evidence of state infringements. 
Conclusion 
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit should be reversed. 
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